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RECENT CASES
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act-Burden of Proof-SEXUAL DANGER-
OUSNESS MUST BE ESTABLISHED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT-People v.
Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
Under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,I the attorney gen-
eral or a county state's attorney may file a court petition alleging that
a person charged with a crime is a sexually dangerous person.2 A sex-
ually dangerous person is defined in the Act as one suffering from a
mental disorder with a propensity to commit sex offenses and a demon-
strated propensity to commit sexual assault or molestation.3 Following
the determination that an individual is sexually dangerous, he is com-
mitted to the Director of Corrections for an indefinite period of time
until he has recovered. 4 The Act appears to reflect a twofold purpose:
to protect the community from sex offenders and to provide treatment
for the individual.
On September 19, 1972, Robert Pembrock was charged with taking
indecent liberties with a child5 by soliciting three teenage girls to com-
mit acts of sexual intercourse.' He had a past juvenile record of sexual
assault. The State's Attorney of Cook County filed a petition to have
Pembrock declared a sexually dangerous person,7 and declined to prose-
1. Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§105-1.01 et seq. (1975)




5. People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976). The Illinois Criminal Code
defines the crime as follows:
(a) Any person of the age of 17 years and upwards who performs or submits to
any of the following acts with a child under the age of 16 commits indecent
liberties with a child:
(1) Any act of sexual intercourse; or
(2) Any act of deviate sexual conduct; or
(3) Any lewd fondling or touching of either the child or the person
done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual
desires of either the child or the person or both.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §11-4(a) (1975).
6. Brief for Appellee at 24, People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
7. Sexually dangerous persons are defined as:
All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed
for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing of the
petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the com-
mission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities towards acts
of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children . . ..
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §105-1.01 (1975).
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cute the criminal charge of indecent liberties. In accordance with the
requirements of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, Pembrock
was examined by two court-appointed psychiatrists8 who testified at the
hearing on the state's petition that they believed he was a "sexually
dangerous person."' Without specifying the burden of proof, the trial
court found Pembrock to be a sexually dangerous person. He was incar-
cerated in the Illinois State Penitentiary at Menard, Psychiatric
Division, until he recovered.'"
On appeal, Pembrock argued that the proper burden of proof should
be beyond a reasonable doubt and that the Act was violative of equal
protection and was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Illinois
Supreme Court in People v. Pembrock" affirmed the Appellate Court
for the First District,'2 which held that: (1) the proper standard of proof
required for commitment under the Act is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt; 3 (2) the Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;" and (3) the
Act is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.'5 This Note will
discuss Pembrock as part of a recent trend, in both federal and Illinois
courts, to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in commitment
proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. It will also con-
sider the possible extension of this strict standard of proof to civil com-
mitment proceedings under the Illinois Mental Health Code.",
For a comprehensive review of the Act, see Burrick, An Analysis of the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act, 59 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 254 (1968).
8. The Act provides that the individual is to be examined in the following manner:
After the filing of the petition, the court shall appoint two qualified psychiatrists
to make a personal examination of such alleged sexually dangerous person, to
ascertain whether such person is sexually dangerous ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §105-4 (1975).
9. During the course of the examination, Pembrock conceded to the psychiatrists that
he had approached three teenage girls and asked them to "have sex with him," but he
further stated that he had walked away when the girls refused him. Pembrock also admit-
ted to having participated in homosexual activities at one time and to having exposed
himself to a child. He has never been convicted of a crime. Brief for Appellee at 24,
People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
10. Id. at 2.
11. 62 Ill.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
12. 23 Ill.App.3d 991, 320 N.E.2d 470 (1st Dist. 1974).
13. Id. at 995, 320 N.E.2d at 473.
14. Id. at 996, 320 N.E.2d at 474.
15. Id.
16. It is not within the scope of this Note to discuss the Pembrock court's ruling that
the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. For a historical review of the Equal Protection Clause, see
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1949);
Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness In Constitutional Adjudication: Toward The End
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In determining that the proper standard of proof to be applied under
the Act was beyond a reasonable doubt, the Pembrock court rejected the
state's argument that the civil nature of the proceeding precluded the
standard of proof used in criminal cases.' 7 Instead, the court relied on
the United States Supreme Court decision in In re Winship'" and the
Seventh Circuit decision in United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin"
in applying the reasonable doubt standard. In Winship, the Court con-
cluded that the possible loss of liberty and resulting stigmatization at
stake in a juvenile delinquency proceeding required that a child could
not be imprisoned when there remained a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.1 Relying on Winship, the Seventh Circuit required that the be-
of Irresponsible Judicial Review And The Establishment of A Viable Theory of The Equal
Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153 (1975); Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
17. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, People v. Pernbrock, 62 ll.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28
(1976).
18. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Supreme Court in Winship obviously was following its own
precedent in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), a juvenile proceeding. The Court in Gault held
that even though the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that juvenile hearings
conform with all the requirements of a criminal proceeding, the Due Process Clause does
require application during the adjudicatory hearing of "the essentials of due process and
fair treatment." Id. at 30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966). That
proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be regarded as one of the due process rights under
the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act seems inevitable when one considers a recent line of
Illinois decisions in civil commitment proceedings leading up to the Pembrock decision.
See, e.g., People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill.2d 306, 309, 205 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1965) (right to
counsel); People v. English, 31 Ill.2d 301, 306, 201 N.E.2d 455, 459 (1964) (right against
self-incrimination); People v. Nastasio, 19 Ill.2d 524, 530, 168 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1960) (right
to confront testifying witnesses); People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill.2d 261, 267, 139 N.E.2d 776, 779
(1957) (right to suppress an involuntary confession); People v. Beshears, 65 Ill.App.2d 446,
459, 213 N.E.2d 55, 62 (5th Dist. 1965) (right to a speedy trial).
This growing trend reinforces the concept that one who is to undergo any type of
involuntary civil commitment proceeding is entitled to the "full panoply of due process
rights" without exception. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); In re Ballay,
482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966); Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d
681 (Ky. 1964).
19. 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976). Frank Stachulak,
like Robert Pembrock, was committed to the custody of the Illinois Director of Corrections
pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act and subsequently confined at the
Psychiatric Division of the Illinois State Penitentiary at Menard. Four years later he
brought an action under the federal habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§2241 et seq.
(1970), and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970), challenging the legality of his
detention and the conditions of his confinement. The district court granted habeas corpus
relief, Stachulak v. Coughlin, 369 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. I1. 1973), and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the decision when Illinois correctional officials appealed. 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir,
1975).
20. 397 U.S. at 363-64 (1970). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In
Speiser, the appellants were denied the tax exemptions provided for veterans by the
[Vol. 26:392
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yond a reasonable doubt standard be applied to commitment proceed-
ings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act in United States ex rel.
Stachulak v. Coughlin.2 The court, after recognizing society's substan-
tial interest in protecting itself from deviant sexual behavior, empha-
sized that the stakes are great for an individual facing possible commit-
ment. Therefore, the court concluded, the proof of sexual dangerousness
must be great enough "to produce the highest recognized degree of certi-
tude. '2 2 This rationale was adopted in Pembrock in its decision to ex-
tend the higher burden of proof to civil commitment proceedings under
the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. 23 The court stated that the drastic
California Constitution for the sole reason that they had refused to take loyalty oaths. The
Supreme Court held that placing the burden of proof on the taxpayers denied appellants
their freedom of speech without allowing them the procedural safeguards required by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 528-29.
The Court in Speiser concluded that there is always a margin of error in factfinding in
any type of litigation; when one party has at stake an interest of such transcending value
as his own liberty, this margin of error must be reduced by placing upon the adverse party
the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 525-26.
21. 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975). The Illinois Supreme Court in Pembrock apparently
was not required to follow the Seventh Circuit's decision in Stachulah. Illinois courts have
held that they are not bound "to follow decisions by federal courts other than the United
States Supreme Court." Occhino v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 28 Ill.App.3d 967,
971, 329 N.E.2d 353, 357 (4th Dist. 1975). Decisions of lower federal courts are not binding
on state courts because the lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over
state tribunals. Corbett v. Devon Bank, 12 Ill.App.3d 559, 567, 299 N.E.2d 521, 525 (1st
Dist. 1973); People v. Battiste, 133 Ill.App.2d 62, 65, 272 N.E.2d 808, 811-12 (1st Dist.
1971), quoting United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075 (7th Cir.
1970). But see Hannigan v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 337 Ill.App. 538, 548, 86 N.E.2d 388, 392
(Ist Dist. 1949); Louisiana Lumber Co. v. Michigan Cent. Ry., 230 Ill.App. 33, 36 (1st
Dist. 1923); Pennsylvania Ry. v. Cunningham, 224 Ill.App. 584, 587 (4th Dist. 1922).
22. 520 F.2d at 937.
23. An additional argument, not raised in Pembrock, is that the need for a stricter
standard of proof becomes stronger as the risk of error in the commitment proceedings
becomes greater. See note 20 supra. Dr. Jay Ziskin, a psychologist-lawyer from California
State University, has pointed to research findings which indicate that psychiatrists cannot
agree on a diagnosis in more than 60% of the cases. See Brief for American Civil Liberties
Union as Amicus Curiae at 9, People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976),
citing J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATmIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 123 (1970). Ziskin's
statistics refer to all types of mental disorders, rather than specifically to conditions of
sexual dangerousness. The major authority supporting the opposite view, that diagnosis
of psychiatric impairment is reliable and valid, is Carl Rogers. See C. ROGERS, CLIENT-
CENTERED THERAPY, IS CURRENT PRACTICE, IMPLICATIONS, AND THEORY (1951).
A staff attorney for the New York Civil Liberties Union and Mental Health Law Project
and an assistant professor of psychology have pointed to the psychiatric tendency to label
more individuals as dangerous than are actually the case in hopes of not mistakenly
releasing those individuals who actually are dangerous. This tendency is known as the
"false positive" phenomenon. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 711-16 (1974). Cf.
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impairment of the liberty and good name of the individual resulting
from civil commitment under the Act must be justified by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, as required by due process under both the United
States and Illinois Constitutions. 24
The issue of the proper standard of proof to be applied under the
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act arises because the Act itself does not
specify the burden of proof to be used. Rather, it provides that proceed-
ings shall be civil in nature. 5 In addition, the Act states that judicial
proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the Civil Practice
Act, 26 but the Civil Practice Act does not contain a provision for the
applicable burden of proof." The courts also have failed to articulate the
specific standard of proof necessary for commitment under the Act.
Illinois courts have held that the burden of proving insanity or sexual
psychopathy is one of overcoming the presumption of sanity2 and that
the committing party must prove the essential elements under the Sex-
ually Dangerous Persons Act by competent evidence.2 However, Illinois
courts have attempted to categorize the nature of the proceedings. It has
been held that sexual psychopath commitments are not criminal pro-
ceedings 0 but that commitment proceedings of the sexually dangerous
Schmideberg, The Promise of Psychiatry: Hopes and Disillusionment, 57 Nw. L. REv. 19,
27 (1962). A University of Chicago doctor has estimated that in 60 to 70% of the cases
dealing with dangerousness and violent behavior, those subjects who are not in fact dan-
gerous are adjudged to be dangerous under the "false positive" phenomenon. Rubin,
Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 397-98
(1972).
24. 62 Ill.2d at 321, 342 N.E.2d at 29. This approach of implicitly balancing the com-
munity's interest in protection of its members and the individual's interest in liberty has
a long judicial history. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910);
Williams v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D.D.C. 1958); Note, The Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635,
636 (1966).
The implicit balancing of community and individual interests has much of its basis in
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The punishment
for an unlawful act must be in proportion to that act. The factors to be considered in
determining this proportionality are numerous. They may include the harm actually
resulting from the unlawful offense, the degree of temptation the wrongdoer faces, or his
moral fault. See, e.g., Note, id. Just as the elements of due process have recently been
incorporated into civil commitment proceedings, see note 18 supra, consistency requires
that the balancing of the individual's interest in liberty and freedom from stigmatization
against his potential sexual dangerousness should be incorporated into commitment pro-
ceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §105-3.01 (1975).
26. Id.
27. Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§1 et seq. (1975).
28. People v. Ross, 344 Ill.App. 407, 414, 101 N.E.2d 112, 117 (2d Dist. 1951).
29. People v. Pearson, 65 Ill.App.2d 264, 267, 212 N.E.2d 715, 716 (3d Dist. 1965).
30. People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 276, 83 N.E.2d 736, 740 (1949); People v. Ross, 344
III.App. 407, 412, 101 N.E.2d 112, 116 (2d Dist. 1951).
[Vol. 26:392
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and psychopathic resemble criminal prosecutions in many respects."
While it usually has been accepted that conviction in a criminal
proceeding requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt 2 and judgment
in a civil proceeding requires a preponderance of the evidence," the
distinction between the two types of proceedings has become blurred.
An intermediate standard of proof known as clear and convincing evi-
dence34 has been introduced in regard to civil commitments under the
Illinois Mental Health Code, which also directs that proceedings be
conducted in accordance with the Illinois Civil Practice Act. 5 This in-
termediate standard of proof was first applied to the Illinois Mental
Health Code in People v. Sansone.- In Sansone the subject was commit-
ted to a mental institution following an emergency petition signed by
the Assistant Director of Social Services, Psychiatric Institute of the
Circuit Court of Cook County. Without specifically defining clear and
convincing evidence, the court apparently reasoned that it was a com-
promise between the two other standards of proof. The court agreed that
the preponderance of the evidence standard was inadequate in view of
the possible loss of personal liberty." However, it refused to apply the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, stating that the Mental Health
Code had already afforded him a right to treatment,3 a periodic review
31. People v. Abney, 90 Ili.App.2d 235, 238-39, 232 N.E.2d 784, 786 (5th Dist. 1967);
Potts v. People, 80 Ill.App.2d 195, 199, 224 N.E.2d 281, 283 (5th Dist. 1967).
32. See, e.g., People v. Boyd, 17 Ill.2d 321, 327, 161 N.E.2d 311, 315 (1959); People v.
Etzel, 348 Ill. 223, 227, 180 N.E. 789, 790 (1932); People v. Fiorita, 339 Ill. 78, 85, 170 N.E.
690, 693 (1930); People v. Benson, 321 Ill. 605, 611, 152 N.E. 514, 516 (1926). See generally
McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAUF. L. REV. 242 (1944).
33. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., 22 Ill.2d 413, 418, 176 N.E.2d 757,
760 (1961); J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE; COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 180 (1947).
34. See text accompanying notes 36-37 infra.
35. Mental Health Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, §1-1 (1975). The Mental Health
Code was enacted by the Illinois Legislature in 1967 in order to provide protections for
persons in need of mental health care who are admitted to mental hospitals. The subject
himself may request his own commitment through either an informal or voluntary admis-
sion. Id. §4-1, §5-1. On the other hand, if the individual does not desire to be treated, he
can be involuntarily admitted by (1) emergency admission, id. §7-1, (2) admission on the
certificate of a physician, id. §6-1, or (3) admission following a petition for examination
and hearing upon a court order, id. § §8-1 to 8-3. For a comprehensive review of the Illinois
Mental Health Code, see Beis, Civil Commitment: Rights of the Mentally Disabled,
Recent Development and Trends, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 42 (1973).
The intermediate standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence, is one of the three
basic standards of proof to be applied in various judicial proceedings. McBaine, Burden
of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 245 (1944).
36. 18 Ill.App.3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1st Dist. 1974).
37. Id. at 325, 309 N.E.2d at 740.
38. Id. The Mental Health Code provides:
If any person is finally found to be in need of mental treatment or mentally
retarded, the court, as part of the hearing shall consider the alternative forms
19771
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of his condition,"9 and a release when he was no longer in need of
treatment.'" Apparently, the court reasoned that these three Code provi-
sions constituted a full panoply of due process protections and con-
cluded that the individual's interests had been balanced with society's
interests in the administration, hospitalization, and treatment of the
mentally ill.'
The Sansone court made two observations in reaching its decision not
to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the court stressed that
because confinement under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act is in-
voluntary, due process requires criminal safeguards.'" Second, the court
compared civil commitment proceedings with criminal proceedings.
While both may result in confinement, the court pointed out that invol-
untary commitment under the Code provides the individual with treat-
ment, periodic review of the patient's condition, and release when treat-
ment is no longer necessary. 3 A similar comparison may be drawn be-
tween the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act and the Mental Health
Code, both of which are civil commitments that may result in confine-
ment. The Sexually Dangerous Persons Act provides for treatment and
release of the individual upon recovery," but there is no provision in the
Act for periodic review of the individual's condition. Rather, it is the
responsibility of one committed under the Act to file an application
of care or treatment which are desirable for and available to the patient, includ-
ing but not limited to hospitalization ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, §9-6 (1975).
39. 18 IlI.App.3d at 325, 309 N.E.2d at 740. The Mental Health Code provides for review
of the patient's continued need for hospitalization as follows:
The superintendent of any hospital in which any patient is hospitalized as in
need of mental treatment or as mentally ill under this Act or any prior Act shall,
as frequently as practicable but not less than every 6 months, review the need
for continued hospitalization of the patient, and make the results of such exami-
nation a part of the patient's record ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, §10-2 (1975).
40. 18 Ill.App.3d at 325, 309 N.E.2d at 740. The Code provides for the discharge of the
individual as follows:
When any person has been admitted or hospitalized under this Act or any prior
Act, upon court order or otherwise, the superintendent of the hospital in which
such person is hospitalized may at any time grant an absolute discharge, or a
conditional discharge in the case of a mentally retarded person, and shall do so
if the patient is no longer in need of hospitalization ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91/2, §10-4 (1975).
41. 18 Ill.App.3d at 325-26, 309 N.E.2d at 741. For other cases utilizing the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard, see In re Sciara, 21 Ill.App.3d 889, 895-96, 316 N.E.2d 153,
157 (1st Dist. 1974); People v. Bradley, 22 Ill.App.3d 1076, 1083, 318 N.E.2d 267, 272 (1st
Dist. 1974); People v. Ralls, 23 Ill.App.3d 96, 99, 318 N.E.2d 703, 706 (5th Dist. 1974).
42. 18 Ill.App.3d at 326 n.11, 309 N.E.2d at 741 n.11.
43. Id. at 325, 309 N.E.2d at 740.
44. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§105-8 to 105-10 (1975).
[Vol. 26:392
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showing facts of recovery with the committing court. 5 It is indeed a
heavy burden for the committed person, perhaps somewhat illiterate, to
prepare an articulate application for a hearing in the hope that it will
be transmitted with reasonable speed through the channels required by
the Act.
Although the Sansone court did not have the benefit of Pembrock,
which was decided two years later, neither of the observations in
Sansone logically can support a different standard of proof for commit-
ments under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act and the Mental
Health Code. First, the court's distinction that involuntary commit-
ment under the Act requires criminal safeguards" ignores the Code's
provision for involuntary commitment.'7 The only additional safeguard
for involuntary commitment under the Code is for review of the patient's
condition every six months." While this review provision may facilitate
early release of the individual, the fact remains that the initial commit-
ment is involuntary and occurs in Sansone on a mere showing of clear
and convincing evidence.'" Therefore, if an involuntary commitment
under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act requires proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, an involuntary commitment under the Mental Health
Code should also require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, even
though the Mental Health Code provides the individual with a periodic
review, shifting the burden from the patient to the superintendent of the
confining hospital, the Code does not afford the subject a full panoply
of due process protections, contrary to the court's conclusion in Sansone.
The clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, a compromise of
preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, cannot
be justified as the proper balancing of individual and community inter-
ests. The Supreme Court in Winship has held that when one will possi-
bly be deprived of liberty or stigmatized through civil commitment, the
only proper standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. 0 If an
individual is committed under any weaker standard of proof, he has not
been afforded the full range of due process protections.
The policy considerations that support the reasonable doubt standard
45. Upon receipt of the application, the clerk of the court forwards it to the Director of
the Department of Corrections, who requests a report on the individual prepared by the
psychiatrist, sociologist, psychologist, and warden of the institution in which the individ-
ual is confined. Only upon submission of this report to the court by the Director will the
committing court allow the individual's hearing to determine the need for his continued
confinement. Id. §105-9.
46. 18 Ill.App.3d at 326 n.11, 309 N.E.2d at 741 n.11.
47. Mental Health Code, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 911/2, §§6-1, 7-1, 8-1 (1975).
48. Id. §10-2.
49. 18 lll.App.3d at 326, 309 N.E.2d at 741.
50. 397 U.S. at 363-64.
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in commitment proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
apply equally to commitments under the Mental Health Code. Commit-
ment under the Code5 carries the same stigmatization and deprivation
of liberty that prompted the court to require a higher standard of proof
in Pembrock. Likewise, a juvenile conviction52 or commitment for sexual
deviance53 carries the same stigma as confinement for mental treatment.
The retention of an individual in a hospital or appropriate Department
of Corrections facility effectively deprives that person of his freedom just
as one committed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act is deprived
of freedom. Thus, the logical conclusion would be to apply the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard to civil commitment proceedings pursuant
to the Mental Health Code, rather than the more liberal standard of
clear and convincing evidence presently being used. 4 If the rationale of
Pembrock, Winship, and Stachulak, based on the loss of liberty and
stigmatization, were extended to other types of civil commitments, the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard also would be required in commit-
ments for sexual psychopaths, alcoholics, and narcotics addicts.55
The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Pembrock has established
beyond a reasonable doubt as the proper standard of proof in commit-
ments of the sexually dangerous. This strict burden of proof, rather than
the more liberal preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing
evidence standard, has been incorporated as one of the due process
elements in this type of proceeding. The court's conclusion extends the
rationale of Winship to civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons.
Whether the same rationale will be applied to other types of civil com-
mitment proceedings remains to be seen.
Edward P. Temborius
51. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 911/2, §6-1 (1975).
52. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64.
53. See People v. Pembrock, 62 11.2d at 318, 342 N.E.2d at 29.
54. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
55. See The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 163 (1970). In each of these
types of civil commitment proceedings, the subject may be deprived of his freedom and
good reputation in return for treatment negligently administered in overcrowded facilities
which offer little chance of cure. Furthermore, these proceedings are all intended to curb
the subject's "dangerousness" or risk of harm to others; but unless the probability of that
harm being manifested is great enough, it is possible for that person to be adjudged
dangerous even though it is doubtful that his dangerousness will be manifested in overt
action. Id. at 163-64.
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